Assahafa.com
Hicham ALAOUI
Trapped between Israel’s desire for hegemony and Iranian radicalism, and abandoned by an increasingly irresponsible United States, the Gulf states view this new regional order as a source of threats and destabilization.
The Iran War marks a titanic rupture in Middle East regional order. For two decades, geopolitical stability within the Gulf and across much of the Arab world centered upon a delicate balance. On one side stood Iran, which was greatly strengthened by the Iraq War, and its “Axis of Resistance” containing various proxies like Hizbullah and Syria’s Asad regime. On the other side stood a conservative bloc of mostly Arab states seeking to contain Iran’s regional ambitions and maintain the status quo with US support. Neither side advocated democracy, but neither did they seek the total annihilation of the other. They lorded over a tense but manageable regional cold war.
This era is over. The Iran War is bringing a more chaotic landscape of fragmented sovereignty and fractured alliances will consume the Middle East in the coming years. The conflict itself has earned rightful criticism given its illegal nature, nebulous goals, and naked aggression on part of the US and Israel, as well as the Iranian military’s indiscriminate and unjustified retaliation on much of the Arab states, as well as its restrictions over the Hormuz Strait that have thrown global oil and gas markets into turmoil.
The Era of “Pax Israelica”
When this conflict ends, the new Middle East must grapple with several stunning transformations. First, the region now resides under “Pax Israelica”, with the State of Israel having become the most powerful military actor thanks to its technological advantages and unconditional American support. Israel has demonstrated a degree of intelligence penetration, long-distance reach, and multi-front engagement that now makes this small Mediterranean country coercively tower over all other Middle East states, save Türkiye. Above all, the Iran War has also neutralized the Islamic Republic as a counterweight to Israeli force.
The arc of Israeli militarism now extends over much of the region. Since the Gaza War began in October 2023, Israel has mounted offensive operations in Palestine, Yemen , Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. Moreover, with the 2020 peace treaties with Morocco, Sudan, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), there are fewer Arab states that still consider Israel as an adversary. Thus, for the first time since its birth, a post-war Israel will face no existential threat from any state-level actor in the region. While non-state actors like Hizbullah, Hamas, and the Houthi movement will persist, no single Middle East country can now credibly checking the expansionist vision of Israel’s right-wing government. Its only restraint will be the US, which has proven repeatedly that it only empowers rather than constrains Israeli aspirations.
There will be stark consequences on Israeli-Arab relations. Whereas before Arab states were courted and wooed to normalize relations with Israel, now they will be bullied and threatened. Israel’s unprecedented bombing of Qatar in September 20251 heralded this new reality. That event signified the vulnerability of the Gulf kingdoms to not just Iranian aggression, but Israeli predation as well as American acquiescence. With the removal of the Iranian threat, now Israel may have the dominion to intimidate and coerce the Gulf states.
This augurs a unique opportunity for Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, who has until now rebuffed intense American pressures to ink a Saudi-Israeli normalization pact. If he continues to pragmatically resist these demands, then he can legitimate himself among not just Saudi citizens but a broader pan-Arab audience. More so than Vision 2030 and the kingdom’s glamorous megaprojects, this may be the singular geopolitical action that burnishes his eventual royal succession. The question, of course, is whether he can plot such an independent course, one that is bold but not self-destructive.
Second, the Iran War has shredded the reputation of not just the West, but the US in particular, through its alliances with the Gulf kingdoms. The Gulf states perceive the Iran War as a meaningless US-Israeli conflict to which they did not consent but must pay the ultimate costs in terms of retaliatory attacks, infrastructural damage, and economic turmoil. Indeed, they now feel like disposable clients—cash cows that the Trump administration can relentlessly milk for financial investments and arms purchases, but who feel abandoned at the altar of higher strategic calculations. Indeed, in the era of Pax Israelica, the only national doctrine that may guarantee the sovereignty of the Gulf kingdoms will be the pursuit of nuclear weapons, even if this runs against US interests.
The US as Arsonist, Not Firefighter
For Washington, this is a radical inversion of its triumphant position after the 1990 – 1991 Gulf War, when it commanded unipolar hegemony over this fragile waterway. It was during the 1990s that the US inaugurated its biggest military bases in these kingdoms, promising to bolster their stability and security in return for wielding strategic primacy over the Gulf. The US positioned itself as a firefighter—a paramount force capable of stamping out regional crises, such as a belligerent Iraq or expansionist Iran.
Now, the US is perceived as an arsonist. It has begun a war and instigated destruction that has paradoxically subjected its Gulf allies to the very insecurity and instability that they believed that allying with Washington would foreclose. Moving forward, Gulf leaders will be far more skeptical about US security guarantees and diplomatic promises. They will continue to look eastwards to China for trade and investment opportunities. Indeed, if the Islamic Republic no longer poses any meaningful threat to the Arabian kingdoms, then there exists little reason for the US to remain their hegemonic guardian.
Third, barring a sudden reversal on the ground, the Iranian conflict has achieved the precise opposite of what its Israeli and American architects envisaged. While it has weakened the Islamic Republic’s external capabilities, the war has made the regime even more extremist and oppressive in terms of domestic politics. US-Israeli strikes have not triggered a mass uprising, despite decapitating the regime’s leadership and destroying much of its ballistic missile infrastructure. The Islamic Republic endures because it is more network than hierarchy. A combination of ideological commitment and organizational decentralization ensures its resilience against all but the gravest crises.
The US-Israeli attacks have, however, removed one critical wrinkle from this political system. There is no more division between reformists, or soft-liners, and conservative hardliners: now, everyone is a hardliner, because the regime is fighting for survival against its mortal enemies. Moreover, the war has inaugurated the political succession of new leaders, such as Ayatollah Mojtaba Khomeini, who have no incentive to negotiate or entertain reforms. This reconfigured regime will crack down even harder upon popular protests, while continuing to defy the demands of the West.
An Asymmetrical Nightmare
The conflict has also elevated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as the true institutional backbone for both the regime and state. The IRGC has orchestrated Iran’s counterstrike campaign, including its most destructive drone and missile attacks upon civilian targets and energy infrastructure in the Gulf kingdoms. More importantly, because the US and Israel refuse to invade Iran given their aversion to conventional warfare and ground casualties, the IRGC and the clerical regime know they have little to lose by continuing to inflict maximal punishment against the US, Israel, and its Arab allies by restricting the Hormuz Strait and escalating its campaign of retaliation. Far from solving the Iran problem, the US-Israeli conflict has instead radicalized it into an asymmetrical nightmare.
Fourth, the Iran War has shattered any illusion that the US and Israel can be stewards of peace elsewhere in the region, particularly Gaza. Neither state has any credibility left as peace-makers and stability providers. Although the Gaza Strip remains under the purview of the US-led peace plan, future governance and security arrangements will be vacuous. Regional governments see these arrangements as an excuse for prolonged Israeli occupation. They will be expected to rubberstamp the new reality.
After Gaza, Israel will likely turn its attention to the West Bank and accelerate its colonial project of annexing the territory and displacing its Palestinian populace, in order to decisively exterminate the dream of Palestinian statehood. This engenders a severe challenge for Israel’s Abraham Accords partners. While the 2020 normalization treaties still exist on paper, in practice these Arab states face a deepening gap between the rhetoric of peace and their strategic gains. Their societies may no longer be easily lured by the promise of more trade, technology, and tourism with Israel, and instead view ties with Israel not as a path to prosperity but instead a destructive bargain with an untrustworthy bully.
Finally, the Iran War will not unite the Arab world. Despite the temporary solidarity that has emerged from the Gulf kingdoms in the face of Iranian retaliation, geopolitical divisions will persist. The Arab counterrevolutionary coalition that prevailed after the 2011-2012 Arab Spring and led by some of the Gulf kingdoms began splintering years ago. Although this counterrevolutionary bloc succeeded in derailing the revolutionary protest wave of the Arab Spring, it failed to replace popular demands for democracy with a viable model of autocratic modernity that could satisfy the masses.
A New Regional Bloc to Oppose the Israel-UAE Axis
Thus, the UAE and Saudi Arabia began to dangerously diverge in their strategic vision by the end of the 2010s. The UAE adopted a caustic strategy of atomizing other regional countries through foreign interventions and deep political involvements, whereas Saudi Arabia sought to temper such adventurism and reconsider its options. These Gulf middle powers have engaged in proxy conflict already on the battlefields of Yemen and Sudan. In a post-war regional order that no longer features a capable Iran that can unite them, new geopolitical factionalism will prevail. The UAE may well fall back upon its Abraham Accords partner, Israel, to counterbalance a new coalition of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Qatar working to maintain some coherent sense of regional order.
In sum, the Iran War will shake the Middle East and transform its geopolitical terrain into a new landscape that was unimaginable just a decade ago. Caught between Israeli primacy and Iranian radicalism, and with the increasing irresponsibility of American hegemony exposing much of the Arab world to insecurity, Arabs will see this new regional order as one saturated with risk and danger. It will be a stark reminder, once again, that neither foreign interventions nor protracted wars have ever done the region much good.
Source: orientxxi
