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Large segments of Moroccan public opinion have expressed deep anger over the attempt by the UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, Staffan de Mistura, to revive the option of partitioning the Sahara between Morocco and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front.
Many have voiced concerns about the obstacles Algeria’s allies are trying to place in Morocco’s path to prevent it from resolving this territorial dispute in its favor. Heightening these concerns is the fact that de Mistura’s proposal came just two weeks after the European Court’s decision to annul the EU-Morocco fisheries and agriculture agreements.
To put the discussion into its proper context, two key points should be highlighted. First, since the onset of this conflict in the 1950s, through the Green March and the intensification of tensions between Morocco and Algeria, influential members of the UN Security Council have maintained the firm conviction that the Algeria-engineered secessionist project is not viable from a strategic standpoint. It goes without saying that Morocco would never accept the establishment of a state that would cut it off from its African depth. As former UN envoy Peter van Walsum told the Security Council during a briefing on January 16, 2006, it is neither politically responsible nor realistic to expect Morocco to agree to the creation of an independent state in the Sahara.
Building on this realistic assessment, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1754 in April 2007, which laid the foundation for the political process, giving prominence to Morocco’s autonomy plan.
Morocco’s position has grown stronger than ever
Second, the Security Council will not impose any solution that conflicts with or could undermine Morocco’s territorial integrity. If the Council could not force a solution on Morocco during a time when the country’s position was relatively shaky and had not yet gained the momentum and support it now enjoys from key countries, how could it possibly do so now? Even when former UN envoy James Baker presented his second proposal in the summer of 2003 and urged the Security Council to pressure both Morocco and the Polisario into compliance, the Council refrained from acting.
Over the past two decades, Morocco’s position has grown stronger than ever. Morocco has been able to steer the political process in line with its historical rights to the Sahara and safeguard its territorial integrity. As I have emphasized in my recent book on the subject and in numerous articles, Morocco’s most significant achievement over the past two decades has been the burial of the referendum option and the emergence of the Moroccan autonomy proposal as the sole viable and politically sustainable solution to the lingering Sahara dispute.
On the other hand, there is no connection between the European court’s decision and the UN envoy’s new-old proposal, nor is there any overlap between the two. The Security Council is the only body with the legitimacy to examine the dispute and propose the best way to end it. Does this mean that other parties have no interest in seeking to sway the European Court or the United Nations in an attempt to undermine Morocco’s recent diplomatic successes, or at least slow down the positive momentum Morocco has enjoyed in the past two decades? It would be naive to think that Algeria and its allies would remain idle in the face of Morocco’s ground-breaking achievements. Although Algeria understands it cannot reverse or undo the progress Morocco has made over the past twenty years, it is determined to redouble its efforts to keep the dispute on the UN agenda and thus prevent Morocco from closing it once and for all.
The series of significant breakthroughs Morocco has achieved recently, particularly France’s recognition of the Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, has pushed Algeria to act swiftly and in all directions in hopes of derailing Morocco’s momentum. Algeria is well aware that France’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara is a game-changer in Morocco’s favor, and that France intends to go steps further to help Morocco consolidate its position. Algeria understands that this recognition is not merely symbolic and that France, as indicated in President Emmanuel Macron’s letter to King Mohammed VI, intends to play “its full role in all relevant fora” to assist Morocco in gaining increased support for its autonomy plan and sovereignty over the Sahara.
The briefing that France’s permanent representative to the UN is expected to give before the Security Council on October 28 will be the first step in translating his country’s newfound commitment to preserving Morocco’s sovereignty over its southern provinces. Algeria fears that this briefing might include an explicit request for the Security Council to enhance its support for the Moroccan autonomy proposal, which could prompt the Council to gradually adopt a language reflecting its tendency to acknowledge that the Moroccan plan is the only viable option for reaching a final resolution to the dispute. As as result, the Algerian government hopes that de Mistura’s attempt to revive the partition proposal might push Security Council members to at least maintain the same language adopted in the resolutions since Resolution 2440 in October 2018, even though that language is in favor of Morocco.
A brief respite for the sinking separatist boat
While Morocco’s autonomy proposal has undeniably emerged as the most realistic and feasible route to a lasting resolution in the Sahara dossier, the network of support Algeria has built over the past four decades in many European capitals continues to maintain its narrative’s stranglehold on the vast majority of Western academics, human rights activists and legal experts. And knowing that its talking points still hold currency in intellectual and activist circles despite the political and diplomatic consecration of Morocco’s plan as the best path forward, Algeria has tirelessly worked in recent months and years to undermine Morocco’s diplomatic breakthroughs and cast doubt on the legitimacy or legality of the agreements Morocco has signed with its European partners.
One of the Algerian government’s key objectives has been to push the European Court to issue a ruling that casts doubt on the Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara. From this perspective, it can be said that the politically motivated ruling issued by the European Court earlier this month, which nullified the fisheries and agriculture agreements with Europe, serves the narrative Algeria seeks to promote — that the legal status of the Sahara has not changed since the 1975 ICJ advisory opinion and that the international community does not recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the region.
Even though the UN envoy harbored no illusions about the prospects of his partition proposal, especially as similar attempts have failed in the past and given that Morocco will never agree to take such a path, the mere mention of the possibility of partition is a lifeline to Algeria’s largely shattered dreams of separatism in southern Morocco. If anything, Algiers sees de Mistura’s desperate attempt to sugar-coat his failure on the Sahara issue as a golden opportunity to give hope to a visibly demoralized Polisario Front and its dwindling cohort of allies at the UN. For example, Algiers could use de Mistura’s proposal as proof that Morocco’s autonomy plan is not as impregnably dominant in UN circles as many had thought; that friends or sympathizers of the Polisario with a modicum of influence within the UN can still derail or significantly delay the resolution of the Sahara dispute on the terms of the Moroccan plan.
The visible invisible hands behind de Mistura’s strange proposal
In fact, insider reports have indicated that de Mistura sought to revive the partition proposal at the behest of Algeria and its shrinking cohort of allies in Europe and elsewhere. It could well be that the idea was whispered to the UN envoy during his surprising and controversial visit to South Africa in January. Never has any UN envoy before him visited a country that is officially not party to the conflict and known for hostility towards Morocco. Even Christopher Ross, the former UN envoy who is no fan of Morocco or of its autonomy plan, never visited South Africa.
One should not be deceived by the press release in which the Polisario leadership stated its rejection of de Mistura’s partition proposal. This statement is primarily for media consumption, meant to muddy the waters and create the impression that the Polisario controls its own destiny and that Algeria is neither a party to the conflict nor does it dictate the Polisario’s decisions. In the unlikely scenario that Morocco were to show even the slightest inclination towards this option, the Polisario would not oppose Algeria’s long-term goal of establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. The hypothesis that the partition idea was whispered to de Mistura by Algeria and its allies is further supported by the fact that the Algerian government has been down this road twice before.
In both cases, the proposal to divide the region between Morocco and the Polisario was presented through former Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The first time was in June 1978, during a meeting the former Algerian leader held with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Bouteflika, who was then Algeria’s Foreign Minister, proposed the partition of the Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario. He assured Vance that Algeria and the separatist Polisario Front would not oppose Morocco’s plans to retain part of the region, including the phosphate mines and a portion of the coast, provided the Polisario could control the remaining part, which was under Mauritania’s control at the time. Mauritania was then facing a fierce military campaign by Algeria and the Polisario to force it to relinquish the area under its control.
Algeria made a second attempt in November 2001. Bouteflika, who had by then become Algeria’s President, held a meeting with James Baker in Houston, Texas. The meeting took place just a few months after Baker, who was then the UN Personal Envoy for the Sahara, presented his first Baker Plan known as the Framework Agreement, which Morocco had accepted. That proposal — which Baker presented after receiving guarantees and assurances from Morocco that it committed to a devolution of authority to the territory’s inhabitants — stipulated that the Sahara would enjoy autonomy for five years, followed by a self-determination referendum involving all residents of the region who had lived there for at least one year.
While the proposal granted the Sahara wide-ranging powers, it also maintained Morocco’s sovereignty in all respects. Most importantly, it preserved Morocco’s territorial integrity, ruling out any attempt for secession from within or outside the region. This proposal was supported by influential members of the Security Council, including the United States and France. However, both Algeria and the Polisario categorically rejected it, as expressed in letters sent by President Bouteflika and the Polisario Secretary-General at the time, Mohamed Abdelaziz. During his meeting with Baker, Bouteflika once again raised the proposal and expressed his country’s and the Polisario’s willingness to discuss the option of dividing the Sahara as a solution to reach a final settlement. However, Morocco expressed its outright rejection of this proposal.
And so, while de Mistura might have given a clear indication of his willingness to do Algeria’s bidding, he should have known that the notion of a potential partition is mere wishful thinking. For one thing, the UN envoy knows full well that the Security Council would not consider that proposal given the developments of the past two decades. And even if the Council were willing to entertain the idea of a possible partition, the fact remains that will never agree to anything that compromises its sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
At the height of the war of attrition between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front in 1980, the late Hassan II brushed aside any talks of a possible division of the territory. In an interview with the New York Times on March 8 that year, the Moroccan monarch rejected a French and American proposal to partition the territory. “Morocco’s claims to the territory are not only unchangeable, but in my view, they cannot the subject of any compromise,” he said.
Interestingly, de Mistura’s comments after floating the partition proposal suggest that he is well aware that the power dynamics in the Sahara dossier have decisively, almost irreversibly, shifted in Morocco’s favor in the past two decades. This was evident as the UN envoy adopted a more realistic tone when he shifted the discussion to the Moroccan autonomy plan. He notably stressed the positive momentum surrounding the Moroccan position and the growing support it has received from an increasing number of countries, including influential ones. In this sense, he seemed to acknowledge that the Moroccan autonomy plan is widely considered as the only solid basis for a final resolution of the Sahara dispute,
De Mistura tellingly cited examples of conflicts that had been resolved through expanded autonomy, such as Scotland and Greenland, to make the case that he is not inherently hostile to the option of resolution through autonomy. Still, he stressed that prioritizing such a path in the Sahara case requires Morocco to clearly explain to the UN the specifics of its plan’s implementation in the concerned region.
De Mistura’s desperation for quick results plays into Algeria’s hands
If one were to read hastily the UN envoy’s briefing, it might initially seem to contain negative implications for Morocco, and one might think that de Mistura is attempting to bring the political process to square one. However, upon careful reading and close examination of every word he said, it appears rather that his briefing carried a clear recognition from the United Nations that the referendum option is no longer a viable option, as reaffirmed by all Security Council resolutions since the end of 2003 up to the present day.
On the other hand, aware of Algeria and the Polisario’s intransigence and their refusal to explore any possibility of reaching a political solution based on the Moroccan proposal, it seems that the UN envoy has reached a point of despair, realizing he will not be able to make any progress in the political process. This led him to take a step that would make it easier for him to resign from his position. In his address to the Security Council, he stressed that if no progress is made within six months, the Secretary-General should reconsider extending his mandate. Knowing full well the impossibility of Morocco agreeing to the option of partition and Algeria and the Polisario’s refusal to negotiate based on the Moroccan autonomy proposal, he essentially unofficially announced that his mission would end after six months.
Regardless of the content of the UN envoy’s briefing, from Morocco’s perspective, any talk of partitioning the Sahara is a non-starter. Such an outcome touches the core of the five-decade-long conflict between Morocco and Algeria and would grant the latter a strategic victory over Morocco at a time when the kingdom has garnered the support of most influential countries for its autonomy plan and its sovereignty over the Sahara. This is the essence of the conflict whose strategic importance for Morocco the UN envoy and his aides have failed to consider and understand.
More intriguing was the fact that, both when he spoke about the partition and the Moroccan autonomy proposal, he seemed to put the onus on Morocco as he urged Rabat to come forward with more explanations and details about the autonomy plan. It seemed as though the UN envoy was stuck in 2007 when Morocco was in the initial phases of garnering support for its autonomy plan. Meanwhile, he overlooked a key and fundamental fact: While Algeria claims that people in the Tindouf camps are genuine Sahrawis, it has rejected request after request from the Security Council to conduct an independent census in the Polisario-controlled camps. Since the early years of Algeria’s embrace of the separatist project, there have been numerous reports and studies documenting that the majority of “refugees” in the Tindouf camps did not originate from the Western Sahara.
According to a December 1977 report by the US Bureau of Research and Intelligence, “the refugee camps there also contain a significant number (conceivably even a majority) of Saharans who arrived from other areas of the desert (Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and even Morocco), either to escape the Sahel drought or because Algerian and Polisario spokesmen induced them to come.”
And so, assuming that the partition proposal was a workable and realistic option, on what specifics would that proposal be based? Who, for instance, will be eligible to be citizen of the imaginary state that would be established in the southernmost part of the territory? Will Algerians, Mauritanians, Malians and even Moroccans from the Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan and Zag — who joined the Polisario — also be eligible to be part of that state? Has the mere fact that they have spent five decades in the Tindouf camps given them a right to claim affiliation to the territory?
The day when Algeria accepts that a census can be conducted in the camps to enable the UN Security Council to assess the number of genuine Saharawis, and when it accepts to negotiate on the basis of the Moroccan autonomy proposal, the UN envoy would be justified in putting the onus on Morocco. Until this has not happened, it is up to Morocco to decide when and if the time has come to explain the autonomy proposal and to whom it should do it.
‘Sahrawi self-determination’ is the least of Algeria’s concerns in the Sahara
By refloating the idea of the partition and expressing regret over the lack of response from the parties involved, he clearly displayed either his unawareness about or his feigned ignorance of the primary reason for Algeria’s embrace of the separatist agenda in southern Morocco. To be sure, Algeria’s relentless efforts to obstruct any progress towards resolving the Sahara dispute are not only due to its fear that Morocco might raise the issue of the Eastern Sahara. Instead, and more fundamentally, Algeria is in desperate need of access to the Atlantic Ocean, something that it hopes will materialize its ambitions to be the hegemon of the Maghreb region.
Since gaining independence from France in 1962, the Algerian political and military elite have been imbued with the core belief that the only way to impose their dominance over the region and secure a safe outlet for exporting their natural resources trapped near the Sahara is to gain access to the Atlantic without having to pass through Moroccan territory. From the Algerian perspective, this can only be achieved by establishing an independent state in southern Morocco, which, due to its fragile economy and small population, would be politically, economically, and ideologically dependent on Algeria.
If this ideal (yet surreal) scenario for Algeria were to come to fruition, it would kill two birds with one stone: 1) Isolate Morocco geographically, cutting it off from its African depth. 2) Deprive Morocco of benefiting from the potential natural resources in the Sahara, thus denying the kingdom the financial revenues that could help it compete with Algeria for regional dominance.
According to a U.S. intelligence memo dated December 12, 1977, Algeria’s primary motivation for supporting the separatist narrative has never been a belief in the sacredness of the principle of self-determination, but rather the pursuit of its strategic interests.
“Although Algeria’s apparent motive in supporting the Polisario Front is the principle of self-determination, the historical rivalry with Morocco for dominance in Northwest Africa is the main driving force. Algeria’s goal in this conflict is to establish an independent Sahrawi Republic in which it expects to have significant influence,” the memo argued. “This would deprive Morocco of the important economic resources of the region and hinder Morocco’s efforts to restrict Algeria’s future access to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, Boumediene opposes Morocco’s integration of Western Sahara because it would challenge Algeria’s ambitions for dominance in North Africa.”
Almost fifty years later, the Algerian playbook on the Sahara remains the same: behind its flashy claims of principled support for “Sahrawi self-determination,” the Algerian establishment is fundamentally motivated by an urgency to gain access to the Atlantic while cutting off Morocco from a region that is historically significant to Moroccan identity and increasingly economically relevant to the kingdom’s leadership aspirations in Africa.
And do, whatever the UN envoy’s motives in trying to breathe new life into the partition option, the very fact that he floated this idea means he is no longer able to explore any opportunity that could help push the political process forward. This means, most importantly, he has failed to grasp the real reasons behind the prolonged conflict between Morocco and Algeria. As I have suggested, any attempt to revive the partition option automatically provides Algeria with a new lifeline to buy more time. Hence, it won’t be surprising if Morocco refuses to engage with the UN envoy in the coming months.
Source: Morocco word news
